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Abstract
We are prone to ethical errors owing to bounded ethicality stemming from bounded awareness. It is possible that unethical 
decision potentially leads to a crucial accident. It was hypothesized that decision makers engage more frequently in unethical
behavior such as violation of rules or regulations to be kept if the decision options are presented in a loss frame than if they are 
presented in a gain frame especially when System1 is mainly used for decision making. As a basic study on safety management, 
in particular, the accidents which stem from the violation behavior due to lack in ethicality, it was explored whether we are more 
vulnerable to unethical behavior in the loss frame of decision making than in the gain frame. Consequently, in the range of this 
study, it was shown that we are not necessarily suffer more from unethical behavior in the loss frame than in the gain frame when 
we make decision relying on heuristic (System1).
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Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
Keywords: Loss aversion; Framing effect; Decision making; Unethical behavior; Safety management
1. Introduction
We are prone to ethical errors owing to bounded ethicality stemming from bounded awareness [1]-[5] especially 
when we have no time to deliberate (System2) and cannot help relying on a rapid, automatic, and intuitive process 
(System1) [6]. Damasio [7] suggested that the visceral and automatic flashes of affect might lead to irrational 
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behavior independently of learned knowledge about morality. 
It is well known that bounded awareness leads to one of the cognitive biases, that is, a framing effect. A framing 
effect corresponds to a phenomenon that transparently and objectively identical situations generate dramatically 
different decisions depending on whether the situations are presented as a loss or gain frame [8], [9]. Therefore, a 
framing effect is expected to function during the process of ethical decision making. More concretely, different 
frames guide different decisions (ethical or unethical behavior), and become a trigger of unethical behavior.
It is possible that unethical decision potentially leads to a crucial accident. A framing effect occurs when 
transparently and objectively identical situations generate spectacularly different decisions depending on whether 
the situations are presented and perceived as potential loss or gain. Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji [6] reasoned that 
individuals who recognize a potential outcome as a loss will tend to engage in unethical behavior to avert the loss 
more frequently and actively than those who recognize the same amount as a gain. Kern and Chugh [10] showed 
that decision makers engaged in more unethical behavior if a decision was presented in a loss frame than if the 
decision was presented in a gain frame. In short, it seems that a loss frame tends to prompt more unethical behavior 
than a gain frame. Because cognitive resources are limited [1],[11], reasoning under System1 (time pressure for 
deliberation) is fragmented, rushed, and eventually vulnerable to cognitive biases than that under System 2 (no time 
pressure for deliberation). Therefore, it might be hypothesized that decision makers engage more frequently in 
unethical behavior such as violation of rules or regulations to be kept if the decision options are presented in a loss 
frame than if they are presented in a gain frame especially when System1 is mainly used for decision making.
As a basic study on safety management, in particular, the accidents which stems from the violation behavior due 
to lack in ethicality, it was explored whether we are more vulnerable to unethical behavior in the loss frame of 
decision making than in the gain frame.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Twenty four undergraduate or graduate students (fourteen male and ten female) aged from 20 to 23 years old 
took part in the experiment. All had no knowledge or skill in psychology or behavioral economics. All agreed with 
the participation in the experiment after receiving a brief explanation of the aim and the contents of the experiment.
2.2. Experimental task
The participants were required to read the following two scenarios A and B.
2.2.1. Scenario A
You are trying to sell your stereo to raise money for an upcoming oversea trip. The stereo functions satisfactory, 
and an audiophile friend of yours tells you that he will pay $500 for it if it were in the market for sale. You don’t 
have much time before you leave for your trip. Your friend advises that you have an x% chance of gaining (gain 
frame) (a (1-x)% chance of losing out (loss frame)) on a sale before you leave for your trip. A few days later, a first 
potential buyer comes to see the stereo, and seems interested. The potential buyer asks if you have any other offers.
2.2.2. Scenario B
You are trying to sell your camera to raise money for making money to purchase a car. The camera functions 
satisfactory, and a camera maniac friend of yours tells you that he will pay $800 for it if he were a professional 
photographer. You are eager to sell the camera as soon as possible. Your friend advises that you have an x% chance 
of gaining (gain frame) (a (1-x) % chance of losing out (loss frame)) on a sale before you leave for your trip. A few 
days later, a first potential buyer comes to see the camera, and seems interested. The potential buyer asks if you have 
any other offers.
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2.3. Design and procedure
The experimental factors were (i) the frame (loss or gain domain), (ii) whether time pressure was given or not 
(System1 or System2), and (iii) x% chance of gaining (gain frame) (a (1-x)% chance of losing out (loss frame)) on a 
sale. The value of x ranged from 5% to 95 % every 5%. The factor (i) was a between-subject factor, while the factor 
(ii) was a within-subject factor. The factor (iii) was also a within-subject factor. An equal number of participants (six 
participants) were allocated to each cell of the condition (i) by the condition (ii). For each participant, each cell of 
the condition (i) by the condition (ii) differed between Scenarios A and B. For example, the participant allocated to 
the loss frame carried out the time pressure condition (System1) for Scenario A, while he or she carried out the no-
time pressure condition (System2) for Scenario B.
Under the intuitive judgment condition (System1), the participant was required to answer within 10 s. Under the 
deliberate judgment condition (System2), the participant was allowed to take time (30 s) to answer the question 
below.
If it is assumed that the potential buyer asks if you have any other offers in Scenarios A and B above. How likely 
are you to respond by saying that you do have another offer? (1=very unlikely to 5=very likely).
3. Results
The mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) (Scenario A) x=25%, 45%, and 90% is shown 
as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether time pressure was given or not (System1 or 
System2) in Figs. 1-3, respectively. The mean rating on possibility of unethical behavior (Scenario B) for x=25%, 
60%, and 90% is shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether time pressure was given 
or not (System1 or System2) in Figs. 4-6, respectively. 
As for Scenario A, for all values of x, a two-way ANOVA conducted on the rating on possibility of unethical 
behavior revealed no significant main effects of frame and time pressure (System1 and System2) and significant 
interaction between the conditions (i) and (ii). Concerning Scenario B, as a result of a similar two-way ANOVA 
conducted on the rating on possibility of unethical behavior, no significant main effects of frame and time pressure 
(System1 or System2) were detected for all values of x. No significant interaction was also revealed for all values of 
x.
Scenario A (x=25%)
Fig. 1. Mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether 
time pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) (Scenario A, x=25%).
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Scenario A (x=45%)
Fig. 2. Mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether 
time pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) (Scenario A, x=45%).
 Scenario A (x=90%)
Fig. 3. Mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether
time pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) (Scenario A, x=90%).
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Scenario B (x=25%)
Fig. 4. Mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether 
time pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) (Scenario B, x=25%).
Scenario B (x=60%)
Fig. 5. Mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether 
time pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) (Scenario B, x=60%).
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 Scenario B (x=90%)
Fig. 6. Mean rating on possibility of dishonesty (unethical behavior) shown as a function of (i) the frame (loss or gain domain) and (ii) whether 
time pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) (Scenario B, x=90%).
4. Discussion
The research hypothesis was that decision makers engage more frequently in unethical behavior if the decision 
options are presented in a loss frame than if they are presented in a gain frame especially when System1 is mainly 
used for decision making. In addition to this, when System2 (deliberate thinking) can be used for ethical decision 
making, it was assumed that the degree of engaging in unethical behavior is not affected by the frame (whether 
decision options are presented in a loss or gain frame). 
Kern et al. [10] insisted that we tend to be more unethical when the decision options were presented using a loss 
frame than when they were presented using a gain frame for only one value of x (=25%). They did not explore the 
effects of x on the unethical behavior. 
The results in this study did not necessarily agree with those in Kern et al. [10]. For both Scenario A and Scenario 
B, when x was less than 85%, the likelihood of unethical rating (falsely respond by saying that the buyer has another 
offer) was lower for the loss frame ((1-x) % chance of losing out) than for the gain frame (x% chance of gaining) 
under the intuitive judgment (System1) condition (see Figs. 1, 2, 4, and 5), while the results of Kern et al. [10]
showed that the likelihood of unethical rating (falsely respond by saying that the buyer has another offer) was higher 
for the loss frame ((1-x) % chance of losing out) than for the gain frame (x% chance of gaining) under the intuitive 
judgment (System1) condition. On the other hand, when x was more than 85%, the likelihood of unethical rating 
was higher for the gain frame (x% chance of gaining) than for the loss frame ((1-x) % chance of losing out) under 
the intuitive judgment (System1) condition (see Figs. 3 and 6). This corresponded with the research hypothesis and 
the result of Kern et al. [10]. It must be noted that the value of x in this study is different from that of Kern et al.
[10].
As for the deliberate thinking (System2), it was not certain whether the likelihood of unethical rating was lower 
for the loss frame than for the gain frame. The likelihood of unethical rating was lower for the loss frame than for 
the gain frame in some values of x (see Figs. 1 and 5), while the likelihood of unethical rating for the loss frame was 
equal to that for the gain frame in other values of x (Figs. 2-4). In addition to this, we could also observe the 
situation where the likelihood of unethical rating was lower for the loss frame than for the gain frame in some values 
of x. In Kern et al. [10], although the x value was limited to 25%, the likelihood of unethical rating for the loss frame 
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was equal to that for the gain frame. Kern et al. [10] predicted as follows. When time pressure was not imposed on 
the participants (System2), the likelihood of unethical rating did not differ between the loss and the gain frame, 
because they were able to take time, think deliberately, and take a proper action. This prediction was not necessary 
true of all values of x (see Figs. 1-6).
On the basis of this result, we cannot reach a definite conclusion shown by Kern et al. [10] that decision makers 
engage more frequently in unethical behavior if the decision options are presented in a loss frame than if presented 
in a gain frame especially when System1 is mainly used. Moreover, it was not confirmed that the degree of engaging 
in unethical behavior does not differ between the decision option presented in a loss frame and that presented in a 
gain frame. What can be conclude from this study is that the combinational effect of framing and whether time 
pressure was given or not (System1 or System2) is more complicated than expected, and that careful and detailed 
exploration is further necessary to identify the combinational effect of these two factors in order to lead to a definite 
conclusion. 
It is said that the time until decision making operators, pilots, or workers afford to use was limited, and they must 
judge their action properly during limited time for preventing crucial accident. In such a case, they cannot help being 
trapped into a cognitive bias (Murata and Nakamura [12]). In other words, it is possible that operators of nuclear 
power plant, or pilots cannot take a proper action due to the framing effect and the heuristic-based quick thinking by 
System1, and in some cases this might lead to crucial accidents beyond expectation. As it might be possible that the 
unethical behavior such as the violation of essential safety rules or regulations is more frequently observed under the 
time pressure and under the loss frame, we must specially pay attention to such a situation and properly monitor this, 
because the complicated combinational (conjunction) effect of the frame and whether time pressure was imposed on 
decision making or not is uncertain at present.
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